Bob jones university dating rules
I A Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to private schools, without regard to their racial admissions policies, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. Since May 29, 1975, the University has permitted unmarried Negroes to enroll; but a disciplinary rule prohibits interracial dating and marriage. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization which holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled. Students who date outside of their own race will be expelled. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's dating rules and regulations will be expelled. The Government counterclaimed for unpaid federal unemployment taxes for the taxable years 1971 through 1975, in the amount of 9,675.59, plus interest. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a divided opinion, reversed. In the court's view, Bob Jones University did not meet this requirement, since its racial policies violated the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial discrimination and, more specifically, the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in education, public or private. The court held that the IRS acted within its statutory authority in revoking the University's tax-exempt status. Several years before this Court's decision in President Truman issued Executive Orders prohibiting racial discrimination in federal employment decisions, Exec. 9980, 3 CFR 720 (1943-1948 Comp.), and in classifications for the Selective Service, Exec. Yet, for a dozen years, Congress has been made aware -- acutely aware -- of the IRS rulings of 19. Congress affirmatively manifested its acquiescence in the IRS policy when it enacted the present § 501(i) of the Code, Act of Oct. Although a ban on intermarriage or interracial dating applies to all races, decisions of this Court firmly establish that discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation and association is a form of racial discrimination, also on certiorari to the same court. and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. Beginning in 1973, Bob Jones University instituted an exception to this rule, allowing applications from unmarried Negroes who had been members of the University staff for four years or more. Goldsboro also asserted that it was not obliged to pay taxes on lodging furnished to its teachers. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina held that revocation of the University's tax-exempt status exceeded the delegated powers of the IRS, was improper under the IRS rulings and procedures, and violated the University's rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's arguments that the revocation of the tax exemption violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The school offers classes from kindergarten through high school, and, since at least 1969, has satisfied the State of North Carolina's requirements for secular education in private schools. As we noted earlier, few issues have been the subject of more vigorous and widespread debate and discussion in and out of Congress than those related to racial segregation in education. Here, however, we do not have an ordinary claim of legislative acquiescence. It is hardly conceivable that Congress -- and in this setting, any Member of Congress -- was not abundantly [p601] aware of what was going on. Section 501(c)(3) lists the following organizations, which, pursuant to § 501(a), are exempt from taxation unless denied tax exemptions under other specified sections of the Code: Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . (Emphasis added.) Section 170(a) allows deductions for certain "charitable contributions." Section 170(c)(2)(B) includes within the definition of "charitable contribution" a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. According to the interpretation espoused by Goldsboro, race is determined by descendance from one of Noah's three sons -- Ham, Shem, and Japheth. It does not ask this Court to review the rejection of that claim.
Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the above "charitable" concept or within the congressional intent underlying § 501(c)(3). Such interpretation is wholly consistent with what Congress, the Executive, and the courts had previously declared. (d) The Government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. (e) The IRS properly applied its policy to both petitioners. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, TOP Opinion BURGER, C. Thereafter, in July, 1970, the IRS concluded that it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3)] to private schools which practice racial discrimination." IRS News Release, July 7, 1970, reprinted in App. The revised policy on discrimination was formalized in Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. 230: Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory requirement of being "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . The sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. The University continues to deny admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption through administrative means, the University instituted an action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the school's tax-exempt status. On January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the University's tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day after the University was formally notified of the change in IRS policy. And in 1962, President Kennedy announced: [T]he granting of Federal assistance for . Yet the need for continuing interpretation of those statutes is unavoidable. In other instances, the IRS has denied charitable exemptions to otherwise qualified entities because they served too limited a class of people, and thus did not provide a truly "public" benefit under the common law test. In 1970, when the IRS first issued the ruling challenged here, the position of all three branches of the Federal Government was unmistakably clear. We therefore hold that the IRS did not exceed its authority when it announced its interpretation of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) in 19. That provision denies tax-exempt status to social clubs whose charters or policy statements provide for "discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color, or religion." Both the House and Senate Committee Reports on that bill articulated the national policy against granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private clubs. The IRS properly denied tax-exempt status to Goldsboro Christian Schools.
Syllabus Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) provides that "[c]orporations . But in 1970, the IRS concluded that it could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools that practiced racial discrimination, and in 1971 issued Revenue Ruling 71-447 providing that a private school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not "charitable" within the common law concepts reflected in §§ 170 and 501(c)(3). 81-3, petitioner Bob Jones University, while permitting unmarried Negroes to enroll as students, denies admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the "charitable" concept discussed earlier, [p596] or within the congressional intent underlying § 170 and § 501(c)(3). [p603] As to such schools, it is argued that the IRS construction of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) violates their free exercise rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 158 (1944), for example, the Court held that neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit children from dispensing religious literature. (1959); Bogert § 369, at 65-67; 4 Scott § 368, at 2855-2856. This I am sure is no accident, for there is nothing in the language [p613] of § 501(c)(3) that supports the result obtained by the Court. Nowhere is there to be found some additional, undefined public policy requirement. The Court seizes the words "charitable contribution" and with little discussion concludes that "[o]n its face, therefore, § 170 reveals that Congress' intention was to provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable purposes," intimating that this implies some unspecified common law charitable trust requirement. The Court would have been well advised to look to subsection (c) where, as § 170(a)(1) indicates, Congress has defined a "charitable contribution": For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of . This, of course, is of considerable significance in determining the intended meaning of the statute. Therefore, it is my view that, unless and until Congress affirmatively amends § 501(c)(3) to require more, the IRS is without authority to deny petitioners § 501(c)(3) status.
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools, independent of racial admissions policies, and granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170 of the IRC. Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. III Petitioners contend that, even if the Commissioner's policy is valid as to nonreligious private schools, that policy cannot constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. The Court's reading of § 501(c)(3) does not render meaningless Congress' action in specifying the eight categories of presumptively exempt organizations, as petitioners suggest. Yet contemporary standards must be considered in determining whether given activities provide a public benefit and are entitled to the charitable tax exemption. Charitable trust law also makes clear that the definition of "charity" depends upon contemporary standards. In approaching this statutory construction question, the Court quite adeptly avoids the statute it is construing. An entity must be (1) a corporation, or community chest, fund, or foundation, (2) organized for one of the eight enumerated purposes, (3) operated on a nonprofit basis, and (4) free from involvement in lobbying activities and political campaigns. [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . A provision of that Act provided an exemption for "corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes." Ch. The 1909 Act provided an exemption for any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual. Prior to 1970, when the charted course was abruptly changed, the IRS had continuously interpreted § 501(c)(3) and its predecessors in accordance with the view I have expressed above. The IRS answered, consistent with its longstanding position, by maintaining a lack of authority to deny the tax exemption if the schools met the specified requirements of § 501(c)(3). Following the close of the litigation, the IRS published its new position in Revenue Ruling 71-447, stating that a school asserting a right to the benefits provided for in section 501(c)(3) of the Code as being organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes must be a common law charity in order to be exempt under that section. [p623] Petitioners are each organized for the "instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities," 26 CFR § 1.501(c)(3) - 1(d)(3) (1982), and thus are organized for "educational purposes" within the meaning of § 501(c)(3). There is no indication that either petitioner has been involved in lobbying activities or political campaigns.
And it is well-settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, 19 How. Section 501(c)(3) therefore must be.analyzed and construed within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the background of the congressional purposes. The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools .
Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity -- namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.
After paying a portion of the federal unemployment taxes for a certain taxable year, the University filed a refund action in Federal District Court, and the Government counterclaimed for unpaid taxes for that and other taxable years. 81-1, petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools maintains a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The corporation operates a school with an enrollment of approximately 5,000 students, from kindergarten through college and graduate school. Petitioners accordingly argue that the IRS overstepped its lawful bounds in issuing its 19 rulings. Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it considers improper; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. This Court has long held the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to be an absolute prohibition against governmental regulation of religious beliefs, at 402-403. The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. In the present case, the IRS issued its rulings denying exemptions to racially discriminatory schools only after a three-judge District Court had issued a preliminary injunction. JUSTICE POWELL misreads the Court's opinion when he suggests that the Court implies that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial of tax exemptions, at 611. In setting forth the general rule, § 170 states: There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year.